Proof-of-work (PoW) is an algorithmic tool used to secure networks by imposing a computational cost on participating devices. Unfortunately, traditional PoW schemes require that correct devices perform computational work perpetually, even when the system is not under attack.
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-ve years after its introduction by Dwork and Naor [23] , proof-of-work (PoW) is enjoying a research renaissance. Originally, PoW was conceived of as a technique for preventing malicious users from acquiring more than their "fair share" of a system resource such as bandwidth or a server's computational power. In recent years, PoW provides a critical primitive for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [62] , along with other blockchain technologies such as Ethereum [26] , BlockStack [10] , and Chain Incorporated [39, 67] .
Yet, despite success with Bitcoin and its analogs, PoW has not fullled its promise of mitigating a wider range of malicious behaviors such as application-layer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and Sybil attacks [21] . These are well-known and enduring security problems for which PoW seems well-suited, and yet proposals [12, 16, 34, 42, 51, 55, 68, 81, 82] built around PoW have yet seen only limited deployment.
A Barrier to Widespread Use. A major impediment to the widespread use of PoW is "the work". Current PoW schemes require a signicant expenditure of resources to secure a system, even when the system is not under attack.
Cryptocurrency systems have cleverly provided monetary incentives for performing the computational work necessary to ensure PoW-based security. They have been extremely successful, both in terms of practical impact [19, 22, 25, 37, 54] , and research impact [11, 27, 33, 62, 78] .
However, the perpetual resource burning inherent to systems like Bitcoin is undesirable for several reasons. First, energy consumption: in 2015, the Economist calculated that Bitcoin consumes at least 1.46 terawatt-hours of electricity per year, or enough to power 135, 000 American homes [24] . This has signicant environmental and economic impact that will increase as technologies like Bitcoin become more widely used. Second, scalability: high energy consumption prevents using current PoW approaches on the many other large open systems that also require security. Third, feasibility: in networks of battery-powered devices -for example, in many ad-hoc wireless settings -energy must be used sparingly, so current PoW systems are simply infeasible. Finally, security: when the mechanism that provides security is expensive, agents will likely selshly seek to reduce costs and thereby compromise security.
In light of these problems, we seek to reduce the cost of PoW systems and focus on the following question: Can we design PoW systems where the resource costs are low in the absence of attack, and grow commensurately with the eort expended by an attacker?
In this paper, we design and analyze algorithms that answer this question in the armative. Initially, our result is presented in the context of the Sybil attack; however, it applies more generally to safeguarding a distributed system from any attack where an adversary seeks to obtain signicantly more than its fair share of network resources. We formalize this guarantee in Theorem 1.1 of Section 1.2.
Our Model
Our problem model consists of physical nodes, virtual identiers (IDs), and an adversary. We say that each physical node is good, and assume that each good node 1) follows our algorithm, and 2) controls at most one ID. We say that an ID is good if it is controlled by a good node, and bad if it is controlled by the adversary.
Speaking of a single adversary -rather than a collection of adversarial nodes -allows us to address the worst-case scenario where such nodes can communicate and collude perfectly in order to launch attacks on the system. We emphasize that the adversary may create as many IDs as it wishes. In practice, for example, an attacker can spoof IP and MAC addresses.
We assume that all computations are instantaneous except for the hashing involved in solving the PoW (explained later in Section 2.1), which dominates all other computations. Let the number of hash function queries that a node can make per unit time be its hashrate. Since the hashrate of a node governs the computational capacity possessed by it, we measure the computational power of a node in terms of its hashrate.
The adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded so that we can make use of public key cryptography. We emphasize however that our solutions do not require any public key (PKI). That is, nodes generate their own key pair, but we do not require a certicate authority to bind a node to its public key, nor do we require any type of key management system.
At any time, we assume that the adversary has computational power at most a 1/ fraction of the computational power of the good nodes, where > 2 is some known constant. That is, the adversary has less computational power than the total computational power held by the good nodes by a factor of ; this is a standard assumption for PoW schemes [53, 56, 62] . Note that we are not assuming we know the adversary's computational power exactly, only a (possibly loose) upper bound.
The adversary knows our algorithms, number of IDs in the system, all messages sent in the system, and it has read-only access to all the messages. This last attribute implies that the adversary cannot tamper with messages being sent out by the good IDs. Also, the adversary cannot block messages indenitely but can insert messages on the communication channels at will.
As a standard assumption, we assume that all processors are synchronized (for simplicity of analysis) but our algorithms can tolerate a small amount of skew.
Joins and Departures. The system is dynamic with IDs joining and departing over time, and time is discretized into rounds. All good IDs announce their departure to the network, while bad IDs do not necessarily do so. We pessimistically assume that all join/departure events are scheduled by the adversary.
The minimum number of good IDs in the system at any point is assumed to be at least n 0 . Our goal is to provide security and performance guarantees for N = O (n 0 ) joins and departures of IDs, for any desired constant 1. That is, the guarantees on our system hold with high probability (w.h.p.) 1 over this polynomial number of dynamic events. This implies security despite a system size that may vary wildly over time, increasing and decreasing polynomially in n 0 above a minimum number of n 0 good IDs.
In Section 3, we employ a commiee -a subset of IDs in the system -which acts to maintain the security of the system; we defer the details until later. While the adversary knows whether an ID is good or bad, and can inform its scheduling decisions based on this information, the adversary is oblivious to which IDs belong to a committee. 2 We do impose a loose constraint on the rate of departures: at most an 0 -fraction of good IDs may depart in any single round, where 0 > 0 is a small, known constant. This assumption is necessary since otherwise an extremely rapid number of departures can leave the system bereft of a functioning committee. Note that this constraint still allows for an amount of dynamism that is linear in the current system size.
Communication Model. All IDs may communicate using a diuse primitive, denoted by BC, which allows a good ID to send a value to all other good IDs within a known bounded constant amount of time, despite the presence of an adversary. The assumption of such a "blackbox" protocol is common in the literature on PoW schemes such as Bitcoin [9, 29, 53, 56] . Moreover, empirical studies suggest that the Bitcoin overlay, for example, allows for such a communication protocol [57] . For ease of exposition, we assume that the time to diuse a message is negligible when compared to the time to solve computational puzzles.
Finally, we note that a message m from ID K cannot be spoofed. ID K signs m with its private key to get sign , and then sends (m ||sign ||K ) via BC. Any other ID can use K to check that the message was signed by the ID K and thus be assured that ID K is the sender. Protection against spoong is necessary later in Section 3 so that the adversary cannot forge messages originating from IDs in the committee.
Main Results
Our main results are summarized below. We measure computational cost as the eort required to solve computational puzzles (see Section 2.1 for details), and we measure bandwidth cost as the number of messages sent and received. The lifetime of the system is dened as the time until at least N = O (n k 0 ) i.e., polynomially in n 0 join or leave events. T 1.1. Let T C and T B denote the total computational and bandwidth costs, respectively, incurred by the adversary. Let new denote the number of good IDs that have joined the system. Suppose the adversary has at most a 1 -fraction of the computational power 1 With probability at least 1 n c 0 for any desired c > 0. 2 One can imagine a variety of attacks aimed at causing good nodes/IDs to fail, and the array of techniques available for mitigating such attacks in the literature. Such issues are important against an adversary that may target committee members, but only complementary to our work here; thus, we omit further discussion of them.
of good IDs (where > 5), then, w.h.p. our algorithm (described in Section 2) has the following properties:
• The fraction of good IDs always exceeds 1/2.
• The cumulative computational cost to the good IDs is O (T C + new ).
• The cumulative bandwidth cost to the good IDs is O (T B + new ).
There are two important ramications of Theorem 1.1. First, the good IDs obtain a large, constant fraction of the system resources. In particular, there is nothing special about a 1/2-fraction and this can be increased as we increase the value of in our attack model. Second, the computational and bandwidth costs incurred by the good IDs grow slowly with the cost incurred by the adversary. Recalling our discussion in Section 1, this is precisely the type of result we sought. When there is no attack on the system, the costs are low and solely a function of the number of good IDs; there is no exorbitant overhead. But as the adversary spends more to attack the system, the costs required to keep the system secure grow commensurately with T C and T B .
Empirical Results and Applications. In Section 4, we empirically test our algorithm, showing that in some networks, our algorithm signicantly reduces computation costs. In Section 5, we discuss applications of our algorithm to 1) Byzantine consensus; and 2) Elastico; Elastico is a committee election algorithm that can be used to achieve consensus on Blockchains for cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
Related Work on Sybil Attacks
There is a large body of literature on mitigating Sybil attacks (for example, see surveys [41, 59, 65] ). Due to space constraints, we summarize only closely related results. Critically, none of these prior results have the desired property that the resource costs to the good IDs grow commensurately with the cost incurred by the adversary. We note that this can be characterized as a resource-competitive approach [5] . However, due to space constraints, we omit a discussion of resource-competitive algorithms since it is not critical to understanding our results.
Most relevant to our work are prior results that employ testing: (1) PoW via computational testing [12] is a popular technique and has been used to safeguard open systems in [47, 51, 79] . Unfortunately, in these prior works, nodes must continually issue puzzles -for example, every 5 seconds in the experiments of [51] -in order to protect against potential attacks. That is, even in the absence of an attack, the system is always in a "hyperalert" state leading to signicant computational waste. This leads to the good IDs incurring a cost that is linear in the lifetime of the system, not linear in the amount spent by the adversary.
(2) In wireless settings, radio-resource testing is a well-known defense [61, 65] . Radio-resource testing has been employed in a setting with a single resource provider [32] and later extended to decentralized systems [31] . However, these approaches suer the same drawback; the system must constantly perform tests to guarantee security which leads to wasted bandwidth in the absence of attack. Again, the good IDs incur a cost that is linear in the lifetime of the system, not linear in the adversary's cost.
Finally, as an alternative to testing approaches, there has been signicant work on leveraging social networks to mitigate Sybil attacks [50, 58, 83, 86, 87] . However, information on social-network connections may not be accessible, or may not even exist (also, interestingly, more recent work argues that topological assumptions necessary to some of these defenses may not hold in practice [85] ). A similar idea is to establish unique IDs using geographical constraints [3, 74] or the physics of wireless signals [30, 52] . Containment strategies -where good IDs are insulated to an extent from bad IDs -are examined in overlays [20, 73] . Another alternative approach is Proof-of-Stake [6, 44, 80] that requires a node to prove that it has access to a given stake (in cryptocurrency-coins) in the network in order to participate, say in generating a block. A drawback of Proof-of-Stake techniques is that they require knowledge of how cryptocurrencies are partitioned among the IDs in the network. Thus, they can only be used in cryptocurrency systems, and are thus not applicable to handling Sybil attacks in arbitrary networks.
Finally, recent work by Pass et. al [69] proposes a consensus protocol for a dynamic cryptocurrency system, where they use the blockchain protocol to elect a new committee everyday. The committee runs a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocol on the transactions to generate a daily log, which is logged in the blockchain. They introduce a new performance measure called responsiveness that is applicable to a cryptocurrency system only if it possesses the ability to log a transaction input to an honest ID within some function of the actual delay rather than that of a loose upper bound on the delay in the system.
A CENTRALIZED DEFENSE
To simplify the presentation of our result, we begin by demonstrating a centralized solution. To this end, we consider a server which can communicate directly with each ID in the system. We emphasize that our assumption of a server is removed later in Section 3.
Our approach employs two types of computational puzzles. The rst type is an entrance puzzle whose solution must be provided to the server by a new ID seeking to join the system. The second type is a purge puzzle which is issued by the server to all IDs already in the system in order to limit the number of bad IDs.
In Section 2.1, we describe the general construction of our computational puzzles and derive guarantees on the amount of work required to obtain a solution. Then, in Section 2.2, we discuss the particulars of creating an entrance puzzle and a purge puzzle. Section 2.3 discusses how our approach employs both types of puzzles.
Computational Puzzles
All nodes have access to a hash function, h, about which we make the standard random oracle assumption [4, 14, 48] . Succinctly, this assumption is that when rst computed on an input, x, h(x ) is selected independently and uniformly at random from the output domain, and that on subsequent computations of h(x ) the same output value is always returned. We assume that both the input and output domains are the real numbers between 0 and 1. In practice, h may be a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2 [66] , with inputs and outputs of suciently large bit lengths.
In general, a node must nd an input x such that h(x ) is less than some threshold. Decreasing this threshold value will increase the diculty, since one must compute the hash function on more inputs to nd an output that is suciently small. 3 We assume that each node can perform µ hash-function evaluations per round for µ > 0. Additionally, we assume that µ is of some size polynomial in n 0 so that log µ = (log n 0 ). It is reasonable to assume large µ since, in practice, the number of evaluations that can be performed per second is on the order of millions to low billions [7, 8, 38] .
For any integer 1, we dene a -round puzzle to consist of nding`= C log µ solutions, each of diculty = (1 )µ/(C log µ), where > 0 is a small constant and C is a suciently large constant depending on and µ.
Let X be a random variable giving the expected number of hash evaluations needed to compute`solutions. Then X is a negative binomial random variable and we have the following concentration bound (see, for example, Lemma 2.2 in [2] ).
For every 0 <  1, it holds that
Given the above, we can show 4 that every good ID will solve a -round puzzle with at most µ hash function evaluations, and that the adversary must compute at least (1 2 ) µ hash evaluations to solve every -round puzzle. Note that for small , the dierence in computational cost is negligible, and that µ is also unnecessary in comparing costs. Thus, for ease of exposition, we assume that each -round puzzle requires computational cost to solve. Finally, a node uses a public key K v , generated via public key encryption, as its ID. The input to a puzzle always incorporates K and s, where the solution string s is selected by (for good IDs, s will be a random string).
How Puzzles Are Used
In our algorithms, puzzles are used in two distinct ways (although, they are constructed in the same manner). First, when a new ID wishes to join the system, it must provide a solution for a 1-round puzzle. This is Step (1) in the pseudocode of Figure 1 , referred to as entrance puzzle. Here, the input to the puzzle is K ||s ||T , where T is the timestamp of when the puzzle solution was generated. We note that, in the case of a bad ID, this solution may have been precomputed by the adversary (using a future timestamp). This is not a problem since the purpose of this puzzle is only to force the adversary to incur a computational cost and to deter it from reusing puzzle solutions (it is not used to preserve guarantees on the fraction of good IDs in the system).
The second way in which puzzles are used is to limit the fraction of bad IDs in the system; see Step (2) in Figure 1 , referred to as purge puzzle. An announcement is periodically made that all IDs already in the system should solve a 1-round puzzle. When this occurs, a random string, r , of (log N ) bits is generated and included as part of the announcement. The value r must also be appended to the inputs for all requested solutions in this round; that is, the input
Input. The following sets are dened: S old set of IDs present at beginning of current epoch S t set of IDs present at time t
Execute the following steps for the lifetime of the system: (1) Upon joining, each ID solves an entrance puzzle and sends the solution s to the server which adds to S t upon conrming the validity of s (2) For any round t, if |(S t [ S old ) (S t \ S old )| |S old |/3, then the server :
• Broadcast a random string r to be used in the purge puzzle • S old set of IDs that returned valid solution
is K v ||s ||r . These random bits ensure that the adversary cannot engage in a pre-computation attack -where it solves puzzles and stores the solutions far in advance of launching an attack -by keeping the puzzles unpredictable. For ease of exposition, we omit further discussion of this issue and consider the use of these random bits as implicit whenever this second type of puzzle is issued. While the same r is used in the puzzle construction for all IDs, we emphasize that a dierent puzzle is assigned to each ID since the public key used in the construction is unique. Again, this is only of importance to the second way in which puzzles are used. Using the public key in the puzzle construction also prevents puzzle solutions from being stolen. That is, ID K cannot lay claim to a solution found by ID K w since the solution is tied to the public key K w .
Algorithm Overview
The rst (centralized) iteration of our algorithm Commensurate Computation (C 2 ) is given in Algorithm 1. Each ID that wishes to join the system and receive service must solve an entrance puzzle in order to register with the server. The only purpose of this puzzle in Step (1) is to force a computational cost on the adversary, even if this cost was incurred in the distant past.
The server tracks the membership in the system using the set S t . Whenever an ID registers with the server, S t is updated. Similarly, when a good ID informs the server that it is departing, S t is also updated. However, bad IDs may not provide such a notication and, therefore, S t is not necessarily accurate at all times.
At the beginning of the system, the server knows the existing membership denoted by S old ; assume |S old | = n 0 initially. At some point, |(S t [ S old ) (S t \ S old )| |S old |/3. When this happens, it triggers the execution of Step 2 whereby all IDs are issued a purge puzzle and must respond with a valid solution within 1 round. The issuing of these puzzles is performed by the server by announcing r to all IDs. A round is of sucient length that the computation time to solve a 1-round puzzle dominates the round trip communication time between the client and server. Note that a recent study of the bitcoin network shows that the communication latency is 12 seconds in contrast to the 10 minutes block interval [18] , which motivates our assumption of computational latency dominating the communication latency in our system.
The server veries a puzzle solution by checking that (1) all C log µ inputs to h submitted generate an output that is at most (C log µ)/((1 )µ); and (2) each of these inputs contains the string r and also the individual public key of the ID. Those IDs that fail to submit valid puzzle solutions during Step 2 are de-registered and permanently blacklisted -that is, they are eectively removed from the system. The actions in Step 2 are referred to as a test. Over the lifetime of the system, the execution of C 2 is conceptually broken into sets of consecutive rounds called epochs, which are delineated by the test in step 2. The process outlined above is repeated where now the server knows the existing membership exactly, S old , at the beginning of each epoch (thus, S t is set to equal S old at this point in Algorithm 1).
Initialization. Prior to the rst epoch, the server issues puzzles to all IDs, and sets variables by running the bullets under Step 2 of Algorithm 1. Thus, initially S old contains less than a 1/3 fraction of bad IDs.
Due to length constraints, our analysis is omitted in this extended abstract, but this is provided in [36] .
A DISTRIBUTED VERSION OF COM 2
We now consider defending against attacks in the absence of a server. We spread the server's responsibilities over a subset of the IDs, called a commiee, and this gives rise to new challenges:
• First, there is no longer a central authority that can be trusted to conduct a computational test. Therefore, this test must be done in a distributed fashion.
• Second, while a server can unilaterally decide whether an ID is good or bad, this determination now needs to be made and agreed upon by the committee members.
• Third, while the correctness of the server is not impacted by joins and departures, the correctness of the committee may be compromised if the fraction of good IDs becomes too small. Our distributed version of C 2 overcomes these challenges through two protocols: C M, which is analogous to C 2 , and M E, which deals with the rebuilding the committee.
Recall from Section 1.1 that 1/ denotes the fraction of computational power held by the adversary, and that > 2. Here, we assume that 5 (see proof of Lemma 3.1).
Committee Construction. In constructing a new committee, there is a sequence of membership intervals
g for k 1 and where d is a constant we can set subject to d 20 (this is required for the proof of Lemma 3.1). For each interval, the ID that generates the smallest hash function output in the k th interval becomes the k th committee member. This determination is handled by the current committee; the details are given in C M and M E (see Algorithms 2 and 3). Given that the adversary has a 1/ -fraction of the computational power held by the good IDs, we expect the newly-formed committee to have a majority of good IDs. This is argued formally in Section 3.1.
Over time, committees are disbanded and rebuilt; the details are presented later. An epoch is dened by committee creation: an epoch begins when a new committee is completed and starts to be used (the old committee being disbanded).
Algorithm Overview and Intuition. In our distributed version of C 2 , the server's role is now taken over by a committee. Over the (1) Perform hash-function evaluations with K ||s ||r as input; let s be the input for the smallest solution found in this round. (2) Use BC to diuse (K ||s ) (3) Upon receiving any (K w ||s w ) from some ID K w :
• If h(K w ||s w ||r ) is the smallest value received in the interval
g for some k 1, then tentatively set K w to be the k th member of the committee; and propagate (K w ||s w ).
• At the end of the round, set the current tentative members of the committee to the nal members.
system's lifetime, this committee must always satisfy two invariants:
(1) a majority of the IDS are good and (2) it has size (log n 0 ). As joins and departures occur, these two invariants may become endangered. In response, a new committee is built from scratch. The details of this construction are described below and in the pseudocode of Algorithms 2 and 3.
Note that we are only describing/analyzing the construction and maintenance of the committee in this section. This committee can replace the server in the algorithm of Section 2 (pseudocode in Algorithm 1), and all prior cost analysis remains valid.
Throughout, let C old denote the set of IDs who are members of the committee at the beginning of the current epoch (which the formation of this new committee delineates). Let C t denote the set of IDs forming the committee at any time t in the current epoch. A new committee needs to be constructed whenever the number of departures from the committee is at least |C old |/3.
When this condition is met, the members of C t agree on and diuse (via BC) a random string r as in Section 2. Agreement can be accomplished via any secure multi-party computation technique for generating random bits; for example, the result in [76] suces.
How is r sent such that each good ID trusts it came from the committee? Recall that a node that joins the system generates a public key, K , and the corresponding private key, k ; the public key is used as its ID. If ID K is a committee member, it will sign the random string r using its private key k to obtain sign . Then, (r ||sign ||K ) is sent using BC. Any good ID can verify sign via K to ensure it returns r . This implicitly occurs in Step 2 of C M, but we omit the details for simplicity.
A good ID K that is a member of the committee is assumed to be issuing "heartbeat" messages; these are periodic announcements that the ID is still present in the system. As with r , these messages are signed by an ID using it private key k , along with the timestamp of when it is being sent. These can be used to verify that the "heartbeat" message was generated in the current epoch and by a member ID of the committee. The absence of a heartbeat message for some suciently-large amount of time indicates to all IDs that the corresponding committee member has departed.
M E (Algorithm 3)
In M E , each good ID, K must evaluate h(K ||s ||r ) throughout a single round using randomly chosen strings s. Of these evaluations, the string s corresponding to the smallest output found by K is BC as the message (K ||s ) by ID K . Note that there is no need to sign these messages; only messages originating from the committee need to be signed. 5 A good ID K w that receives such a message checks whether h(K ||s ||r ) yields the smallest output it has seen so far during this round and, if so, K w tentatively sets K as the k th committee member and propagates (K ||s ) as dictated by BC; otherwise, the message is discarded. By this process, if s is the smallest value in some membership interval, then the entire system (including K ) learns this via BC, and each good ID will consider K to belong to the committee being constructed. Note that this means that all good IDs eventually agree on the membership of the committee.
Over the round during which this construction is taking place, the existing committee still satises the invariants (1) and (2). Thus, the system is always live; that is, a functioning committee is always available. After the round completes, the new committee members are known to all good IDs in the system. Those "old" committee members that were present prior to this construction are no longer recognized by the good IDs; we say the old committee is disbanded. Finally, any messages that are received after this single round are considered late and discarded.
Initialization. Prior to the rst epoch, our algorithm is initialized as follows. First, a global random string r is generated; this can be done using a "heavy-weight" algorithm such as that of [1] . Next, we run M E using this random string r as the seed for the required puzzles.
Analysis of Distributed C 2
In this section, we prove that C M and M E maintain the invariants that the committee has (1) a majority of good IDs and (2) size (log N i ) for any epoch i over the lifetime of the system. Furthermore, we derive bounds on the bandwidth and computational costs of these algorithms.
To simplify our presentation, the claims made throughout this section are proved to hold with probability at least 1 O (1/n +2 0 ). By providing this "slack" of an (1/n 0 )-factor in each guarantee in this section, we show this is feasible while avoiding an analysis cluttered with specic settings for the constants used in our arguments.
When computing the bandwidth cost for the decentralized network, we assume that the good nodes are connected in a sparse 5 Recall that a solution cannot be stolen given that it is tied to the ID that obtained it via the puzzle construction (see Section 1.1). The adversary might (bizarrely) obtain a solution for a puzzle that incorporates a good ID K and then diuse (K | |s ), but that does not help the adversary. overlay network. In particular, for epoch i, we assume that the number of edges in this network isÕ (G i ). Then, we have: T 3.1. For appropriate constants and all t > 0, the following properties hold with probability at least 1 O (1/n +2 ) for Distributed C 2 :
• C t has more than a 1/2-fraction of good IDs, • |C t | = (log n 0 ), • The total computational cost to the good nodes is O (T C + new ),
• The total bandwidth cost to the good nodes isÕ (T B + new ).
EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
We simulate C 2 to evaluate its performance against a wellknown PoW scheme named SC [51] . The experiments allow us to (1) compare the computational cost incurred by the good IDs and (2) investigate the extent to which a Sybil Attack can impact the fraction of good IDs under these two algorithms.
We simulate the centralized version of C 2 . Our goal is to oer a proof of concept, not a full-edged comparison. In this vein, we simulate the centralized algorithm as it greatly reduces the number of parameters that we need to correctly estimate. Because the distributed version has asymptotically equal resource costs, we expect similar performance for the distributed algorithm.
Finally, note that we performed Monte-Carlo Simulations for generating each set of plots, where each observed value was averaged over 20 separate simulations.
Overview of SC. Under this algorithm, the number of bad IDs are limited through the use of computational puzzles. Each ID must solve a puzzle to join the system. Additionally, each ID periodically (every 5 seconds) tests its neighbors with a puzzle, removing those IDs from its list of neighbors that failed to provide a solution within a time limit. It may be the case that an ID is a neighbor to more than one ID and thus, receives multiple puzzles to solve simultaneously; in this case, they are combined into a single puzzle whose solution satises all the received puzzles. We implement our own simulation of the SC algorithm.
Points of Comparison.
To compare both algorithms fairly, we assume that the computational cost for solving a single PoW is 1 for both algorithms. Since in both algorithms require that a new ID solves a puzzle to join the system, we refrain from measuring this computational cost. We let the fraction of computational power of the adversary, be the same for both algorithms.
We rst examine performance on real-world Bitcoin data [63, 64] in Section (4.1). In Section (4.2), we present a comparative study on three real-world peer-to-peer networks, namely -BitTorrent, Skype and Bitcoin [35, 63, 64, 77] . Finally, we study the eect of joins and departures on the two algorithms presented in Section (4.3), where we simulate session lengths governed by Weibull Distribution.
The Bitcoin Network
We simulate SC and C 2 on a real-world dataset for the Bitcoin Network [63, 64] .This Bitcoin Dataset spans a period of one week and consists of timestamps for join/departure events. In our experiments, we assume = 10 and investigate the computational cost under two scenarios: (1) in absence of bad IDs and (2) when bad IDs are present (i.e., the system is under attack). We simulate scenario (1) by assuming all the events in the dataset are result of good IDs joining/departing the system. Figure 1a shows the computational cost to the good IDs for SC and C 2 in the absence of an attack using the Bitcoin Dataset. In Figure 1a , the dense green area signies the high frequency of computational cost paid by good IDs in SC in comparison to the increasingly-spaced blue plot for C 2 . Also, from Figure 1b , it can be seen that the cumulative computational cost to the good IDs diers by greater than 4 orders of magnitude just after 13 hours of simulation and this gap keeps widening with time. This empirical observation strengthens our belief in the cost eciency of C 2 in comparison to SC. Figure 2 shows the empirical results for the second scenario, where we simulate a large-scale Sybil attack using the Bitcoin Dataset. The attack is orchestrated using the following adversarial strategy. Every 5 seconds, the adversary adds n 3 bad IDs to the network from time t 3 to 2t 3 , where n is the total number of IDs at the time and t = 60, 4970 seconds (7 days) is the total execution time. Given that the adversary adds n 3 IDs every 5 seconds, a computational test is triggered in both algorithms every 5 seconds.
In Figure 2a , the dense green region represents the computational cost paid by the good IDs in SC, the dense blue region represents that paid by good IDs in C 2 and the red region by the adversary. Due to the setup of the stress test, the computational cost paid by good IDs in both the algorithms from t 3 to 2t 3 , is equivalent, thus the blue region overlaps the green. The cumulative cost to the good IDs in SC, C 2 and the adversary can be compared through Figure 2b , which shows that the cost incurred in C 2 is less than that to SC and also, C 2 's cost is a function of the cost paid by the adversary, unlike SC.
Peer-to-Peer Networks
We next compare the performance of the two algorithms on three dierent peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, namely BitTorrent, Skype and Bitcoin [35, 63, 64, 77] . For the BitTorrent network, we performed experiments on two BitTorrent servers, namely -BitTorrent Debian and BitTorrent Flatout. The shape (k) and scale ( ) parameter values of Weibull Distribution for session time of k = 0.38 and = 42.2 for Debian, and k = 0.59 and = 41.9 for FlatOut. The Skype supernodes had also have a Weibull Distribution for session time with median session time of 5.5 hours, and shape parameter of 0.64. We generate the session time for 10,000 good IDs from these parameter values and sample for the bitcoin network from the real-world data obtained from [63, 64] . For all empirically generated data, 1 unit of time corresponds to 1 second. We simulate SC and C 2 on each of these networks, and compare the computational cost to the good IDs per unit time. Figure 3 illustrates the results. We observe that C 2 outperforms SC in all three peer-to-peer systems in terms of computational costs of the network. C 2 outperforms SC by 34.51% in BitTorrent Debian, by 45.56% in BitTorrent FlatOut, by 99.94% in Skype Supernodes and 83.88% in Bitcoin. We use the following denition of performance: 100
Eect of Joins and Departures
Empirical studies of session lengths in peer-to-peer network show Weibull Distribution [84] as a better t on real time data in comparison to the popularly-used Poisson Distribution [77] . Hence, we used the Weibull distribution to generate the session lengths of IDs. The average session length ranged from as low as 0.1 seconds to 10000 seconds. The system was initialized with 10000 good IDs and the simulations were carried out until 15000 new IDs joined. Each new ID could be good or bad with probability 0.5. For each value of average session length, we took the mean of 30 runs.
As shown in the plots, with increase in the average session length (order of hours), C 2 is able to give similar guarantees as SC in terms of the maximum percentage of bad IDs in the system at much lower computation cost to the good IDs (Figure 4 ). On the other hand, when session length are small (order of minutes), C 2 is able to maintain a constant percentage of bad IDs in the system whereas SC is not able to give any such guarantees (the percentage of bad IDs can become unbounded).
APPLICATIONS 5.1 Byzantine Consensus
Background. The problem of Byzantine Consensus (BC) was introduced by Lamport, Shostak and Pease [49] (this is also referred to as Byzantine Agreement). There are n nodes, of which some hidden subset are bad. These bad nodes may deviate from a prescribed algorithm in an arbitrary way. The remaining nodes are good, and will follow our algorithm faithfully. Each good node has an initial input bit. The goal is for (1) all good nodes to decide on the same bit; and (2) this bit to equal the input bit of at least one good node.
Byzantine consensus enables the creation of a reliable system from unreliable components. Therefore, it is not surprising that BC is used in areas as diverse as: maintaining blockchains [11, 28, 33, 56] ; trustworthy computing [13, 15, 17, 75] ; and databases [60, 70] .
A major shortcoming of current algorithms for BC is that they do not scale. For example, Rhea et al. write: "Unfortunately, Byzantine agreement requires a number of messages quadratic in the number of participants, so it is infeasible for use in synchronizing a large number of replicas" [72] . This quadratic message cost hinders deployment in modern systems where the number of participants can be large.
Recent results reduce the total number of messages toÕ (n 3/2 ) [45, 46] . However, these algorithms (1) have high cost in practice; (2) are complicated to implement; and (3) require non-constructive combinatorial objects such as expander graphs.
How Our Result Applies. Our result allows us to reduce the communication cost for BC. The bad nodes are again incarnated as a single adversary with equivalent computational power. Each good node has a single ID, while the adversary is not constrained in its creation of IDs.
We employ the result in Section 3. The members of the committee execute any BC algorithm that requires a quadratic number of messages; this implies a message cost of O (log 2 n). The committee then diuses the signed consensus value to all other IDs. On receiving these agreed upon values from their committee members, the non-committee members take the majority of these veried consensus values. Since committee has a majority of good members, this results in all IDs holding the correct consensus value.
In this way, we are able to solve traditional BC withÕ (n) number of messages in total. Additionally, via our guarantees in Section 3, we can solve a dynamic version of BC, where IDs are joining and leaving, and can do so with computational cost to the good IDs that is commensurate with the cost incurred by the adversary.
E: Committee Election
Background. E is a secure protocol [53] , which aims to achieve agreement on a set of transactions in a blockchain i.e., the state of the blockchain. Informally, the core idea is to partition the system into smaller fragments called committees, where each committee executes a BC protocol to agree upon its set of transactions. Then, the committee that was formed last -referred to as the nal commiee -computes the nal digest of all transactions in the system; these transactions having been received from other committees. This nal digest is broadcast to all other participants.
How Our Result Applies. To reduce message costs, E employs a special committee called the directory commiee (DC), which coordinates the formation of all other committees. We propose the election of the DC using our algorithms C M and M E. This would ensure (1) the committee contains a majority of good IDs for a polynomial number of join and leave events; and (2) bandwidth and computational costs grow commensurately with the costs of the adversary.
CONCLUSION
We have described algorithms to eciently use PoW to reduce the fraction of bad IDs in open systems. Unlike previous work, our algorithms require the good nodes to expend computational resources that grow only linearly with the computational resources expended by the adversary. An interesting open problem is whether we can adapt our technique to secure multi-party computation (MPC) which involves designing an algorithm to compute the value of an n-ary function, f , over private inputs from n nodes x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n , such that the nodes learn the value of f (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ), but learn nothing more about the inputs than what can be inferred from this output of f . The problem is generally complicated by the assumption that an adversary controls a hidden subset of the nodes. We believe that our algorithms could be used to solve a dynamic version of secure MPC, while ensuring that the resource costs to the good nodes is commensurate with the resource costs to an adversary.
